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OBLIGATIONS
J. Denson Smith*
Judicial recognition of the principle that an offeror has the
legal power to render his offer irrevocable for a period of time
simply by an expression of will to that effect has been unclear.
However, in the recent case of Housing Authority of the Town
of Lake Arthur v. T. Miller & Sons,' an attempt by a bidder to
revoke his bid without allowing to the housing authority thirty
days from the opening of bids for its acceptance, as provided in
the bid, was held ineffective. The court did not consider Article
1809 of the Code and it is not clear just why the proposal was
counted as irrevocable by the bidder while the offeree remained
legally free to accept or reject. Of course, the irrevocability of
the offer would appear to be fully supported by that article. Indeed, there is common law authority for a like result in the making of contracts for public works, notwithstanding the general
2
rule that an offer unsupported by consideration is revocable.
The thirty-day period was held to begin on the day next after
the opening of the bids.
The court dealt with four problems concerning the admissibility of parol evidence that warrant noting. The rules are
clear enough but their application is troublesome. Where an attack is made on a contract on the basis of the cause expressed
therein, Article 1900 of the Civil Code provides that the contract
cannot be invalidated if the party can show the existence of another true and sufficient cause. The decision of the court in
Love v. Dedon3 sustains this principle in effect by finding that
the introduction of parol evidence in such a case is not disallowed by Article 2276. In consequence, the wife's attack on
simultaneous transfers between herself and her husband based
on the ground that they constituted sales between a husband and
wife failed, since the evidence established that the transfers
were actually made by the parties, who were judicially separated
from each other, in settlement of their rights in the property.
As indicated by the court, the parol evidence, rather than de*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 239 La. 966, 120 So.2d 494 (1960).
2. 1 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 46 (1950). See Daddario v. Town of Milford,
296 Mass. 92, 5 N.E.2d 23 (1936) and comment thereon in 12 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 338-41 (1937).
3. 239 La. 109, 118 So.2d 122 (1960).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXI

stroying the effectiveness of the acts, had the effect of sustaining them. This seems to be in full accord with the principle
stated in Article 1900. A similar holding, recognizing the admissibility of parol evidence to establish motive or intent, was
made in Collins v. Brunet,4 and the plaintiffs were held entitled
to a reconveyance of certain property they had previously transferred to the defendant. The use of parol evidence to show that
an assignment of a mineral lease was held in escrow pending an
investigation of the title of the lessors and was not delivered nor
was the price paid until the title had been approved was sustained in Wampler v. Wampler.5 In keeping with this disposition
of the case, it is generally held that parol evidence is admissible
to show that delivery of an instrument was withheld pending the
occurrence of a condition to its effectiveness."
A more complicated and interesting problem of parol evidence was before the court in Smith v. Smith.7 Notwithstanding
the well-established rule which permits proof of a simulated
transfer by a party thereto only by means of a counter letter or
interrogatories, parol evidence was admitted on behalf of a former husband to show that a transfer to his wife in the form of
a dation en paiement was not supported by any existing indebtedness on his part. The theory of the court seemed to be that,
this being the case, the transfer between husband and wife was
not a permissible contract within the provisions of Articles 1790
and 2446 of the Civil Code and, therefore, was in fraud of the
law. However, the husband is permitted to make a donation of
the community immovables to his wife subject to the rights of
forced heirs, or to his own right to attack the transfer as a donation omnium bonorum. Where a transfer is made without any
price -even
in the form of an existing indebtedness - it may
stand as a donation provided that it is in the required form and
a donation between the parties is not forbidden. Consequently,
the present transfer might have been valid as a donation, as far
as the husband was concerned, provided it left him with enough
for his subsistence and support. By showing merely that there
was no existing debt to support the transfer as a dation en paiement the possibility of a valid donation would not be negatived.
In short, treated simply as a donation to the wife, it would be in
4. 239 La. 402, 118 So.2d 454 (,960).
5. 239 La. 315, 118 So.2d 423 (1960).
6. 3 CoRBIN ON CONTRACTS § 589 (1950) ; RESTATEMENT
and see Corbin's comment thereon in Note 72 to § 589.
7. 239 La. 688, 119 So.2d 827 (1960).

OF CONTRACTS

§ 241,
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fraud of the law only if it was a donation omnium bonorum.
Consequently the court might conceivably have taken the position that parol evidence was not admissible to show that the
transaction was a simulated transfer but that it was admissible
to show that the transfer was a prohibited donation omnium
bonorum. This contention seems to have been made by the defendant but the court refused to so limit the evidence. The result of excluding proof by parol that the transfer was a pure
simulation would have been that the husband would have had to
prove that the transfer was either a donation omnium bonorum,
or if he could have done so, was a prohibited sale for a price in
current money. The problem is explored more fully elsewhere in
this Review.
On the basis of the facts before it in Hughes v. Breazeale,8
the court held that the defendants had assumed the risk that the
municipal authorities might not approve a plan for offsite improvements in connection with the development of a subdivision.
In consequence they were held liable on a note they had
given by way of a penalty conditioned on their failure to construct the improvements, notwithstanding that they could not
secure the necessary authorization.
Article 1939 of the Civil Code permits the recovery of interest on interest provided that the amount of interest due on an
obligation is added to the principal and made part of a new contract. In Mayfield v. Nunn9 a creditor holding an overdue note
took a new note which included the amount due and $5,166.30 in
addition as a bonus. The new note stipulated interest at the rate
of eight per centum from date. It was held that the stipulation
for interest from date was not permitted under Article 1939
inasmuch as the bonus constituted discount or interest, and the
allowance of interest thereon would constitute the payment of
interest upon interest. Of course, if the bonus had constituted
interest already due on the original obligation which had been
added to the principal when the new note was given, the exception of the article would have been applicable.10
In W. R. Aldrich & Co. v. Gravity DrainageDistrict No. 1 of
Rapides Parish," the court refused to construe R.S. 38:2211
dealing with the letting of public contracts so as to justify the
8. 240 La. 126, 121 So.2d 510 (1960).
9. 239 La. 1021, 121 So.2d 65 (1960).
10. See footnote 6, by the court, id. at 1021, 121 So. at 70.
11. 238 La. 190, 114 So.2d 860 (1959).
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award of a storm drainage contract to the second lowest bidder
on the whole project. The award was made after two items had
been deleted because of insufficient funds with the result that
the second lowest bidder was then the lowest bidder. The action
of the defendant seemed to have been taken in complete good
faith but the court felt that to approve it would be to sanction a
practice which would permit the manipulation of items within a
contract proposal so as to defeat the purpose of the statutory
provision. Justice McCaleb dissented on the basis of the language of the proposal signed by all of the bidders which, in his
opinion, reserved to the defendant the right to remove any section, part, or segment of work from the contract, and on a Pennsylvania case 12 which followed the view that where the proposal
notifies the bidders in advance that all bids or parts of bids may
be rejected, the standard of competition is the same for all persons desiring to compete for the work. He felt that to deprive
the public authority of such a privilege, and compel it to readvertise, would be contrary to the public interest. The majority
opinion declined to find the cited case sufficiently persuasive to
override its view concerning the meaning of the statute. Since
the statute provides that the contract shall be let to the lowest
responsible bidder, it does appear that the view taken by the
Pennsylvania case would not preclude manipulation to the advantage of one bidder over another and that alternative bids can
be sought where there is doubt that the available funds will be
sufficient to cover all of the desired work.
A sewer sub-contractor was found not responsible for breakage in the sewer line he installed since the evidence disclosed
that the material furnished by him and the workmanship were
in keeping with his contract obligations and that the difficulty
stemmed from the insufficiency of the plans he was compelled
to follow. 13 He was given judgment against the principal con-

tractor and the latter was in turn given judgment against the
developer for whom the work was being done. The question of
whether the developer was entitled to reimbursement from the
Sewerage and Water Board, which furnished the plans and inspected the actual work, was not passed upon. The court's opinion contains a painstaking examination of the evidence adduced
at the trial and its basic holding was placed on the ground that
12. Straw v. City of Williamsport, 286 Pa. 41, 132 AtL 804 (1926).
13. Keller Construction Corp. v. George W. McCoy & Co., 239 La. 522, 119
So.2d 450 (1960).
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the contractor had warranted the sufficiency of the plans to the
sub-contractor. The developer was held likewise to have warranted the plans to the contractor. The court pointed out that
R.S. 9:277114 was not in effect at the time the contract was
formed.
On the basis of the facts before it in Southern Scrap Material
Co. v. Commercial Scrap Materials Corp.,15 the court properly
found that damages sustained by a buyer for breach of a contract to deliver steel should be determined as of the time delivery
was due under a final extension agreement. This is but an application of the rule that damages in such a case should be measured as of the time performance is due. Here the original time
for performance was extended by mutual agreement.
In B. F. Edington Drilling Co. v. Yearwood, 16 the court
denied recovery of the contract price for a well-drilling contract
on finding that the plaintiff had committed a substantial breach
of the contract. It refused to pass on the claim made in the brief
on appeal by which plaintiff sought recovery in quantum meruit
for the value of the services rendered on the ground that such
recovery had not been claimed in the alternative.
SECURITY DEVICES
Joseph Dainow*
In Harvey v. Thomas,' the property sold at foreclosure sale
was subject to a variety of mortgages and other encumbrances,
and the debtor tried to salvage the $4,000 homestead exemption. 2
For some of the claims there was a homestead waiver, and if
these would be paid first, some of the others would be cut out,
and the debtor would get the $4,000 homestead exemption. However, to do this would disregard the basic rule of ranking among
mortgages8 and the court properly insisted upon their payment
in the order of their priority. Accordingly, some mortgages
without waiver of homestead were paid out of the funds in
14. La. Acts 1958, No. 183.
15. 239 La. 958, 120 So.2d 491 (1960).
16. 239 La. 303, 118 So.2d 419 (1960).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 239 La. 510, 119 So.2d 446 (1960).
2. LA. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
3. LA. CIVIM CODE art. 3329 (1870).

